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« New Working Paper on Henry Hazlitt | Main | The Social Philosophy of Ludwig von Mises is Not the Same as Either Murray Rothbard's or Ayn Rand's »


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Don't miss all the other great resources on the E G West Foundation site, continuing the work of the late Ed West on private education and classical liberalsm at large.


A wonderful example of society triumphing over the state.

Splendid ...

İkinci el inşaat makinaları satan firmalar ve ilanlar

"Awesome" doesn't even begin to describe it.

What is the purpose of attending these extralegal schools? Is is basic literacy and arithmetic, or will the students be able to matriculate at government-recognized high schools or universities?

Don't know what you mean by extralegal, I suppose that is a slur. The aim is to provide whatever education the people want and need at that time and place. And to do better than the 'legal' systems which on OECD stats release almost 20% of students after ten or twelve years who are classified as functionally illiterate. That is pretty awesome too:)


I took the word "extralegal" from the E.G. West Center themselves. That's what led me to ask the question I did.

Did I answer your question about the purpose of attending those schools?


Don't worry about it. I'll send Dr. Dixon an e-mail. I might even make a research project of it.

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Magnificent items from you, man.I have read your blog and i got a very useful and knowledgeable information from your blog.its really a very nice article.
I really like what you’ve acquired here, certainly like what you’re saying and the way in which by which you assert it. You’re
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Thanks for posting this, Pete.

Lee,Falsificationists don't have to try to disprove, make less cirdeble, or decrease the probability of some x are y in order to provoke the charge of overlooking an important logical symmetry. All they have to do is falsify all x are y , for this is allegedly the same as verifying the negation of all x are y , i.e., the same as saying that there exists some x which is not-y. It is true as you indicate that this does not make falsificationism comparable to inductivism. It is also true that it doesn't obliterate the asymmetry between universal and existential statements made famous by Popper in LSD. But the critics don't deny any of that. Their point is rather that talk about falsification is nothing more than talk, because you might as easily talk about verifying the negations of universal generalizations. In other words, there's nothing really different or special about falsificationism. It's just verificationism turned on its head. Now, you haven't escaped from this criticism and I don't think you can, because it is correct and it's just a matter of logic. In other words, if all you're looking at is the logic of statements, you're definitely going to lose the argument with the critics. But that's precisely why they want to focus exclusively on the logic of statements! In fact, the more egregious members of that club refuse point blank to discuss methodology .. what they say, in effect, is something like oh pooh pooh if all you're going to do is talk about method, don't bother me; I don't care about it. After all, we're all big boys and girls I think we can figure out what to do. End of discussion (I've had this discussion more than once; I know .. this is no exaggeration.)The only successful way of addressing this criticism that I know of is to recognize that critical rationalism is about method. Falsificationism is methodologically unlike verificationism, because verifications are circular whereas falsifications are not. I really do not see how anyone can defend critical rationalism on the grounds of logic alone. And, while I do not want to put words into anyone's mouth, I think that assessment of the situation is consistent with what both Popper and Miller have written. I'm not so sure it is consistent with what many others have written.Once the confusion between logic and method is ejected, the label falsificationism because unproblematic. So .. if you want to eject it, go ahead. But don't let the critics run you off that property against your will. You may end up paying for it later anyway.

above:a) Observational and experimental edicenve may not be interpreted as support for any claim of greater logical strength than an existential hypothesis. It should be clear from the video that Teleyarkhan violated this principle, even though his theory may be correct. My guess is that this is where the trouble for Teleyarkhan started, and that his career might still be intact if he had not done this. I don't think that the mistake was dishonest; I think it was just a mistake, though I also think it plausible that Teleyarkhan may have been less than honest later on when lots of pressure had been brought to bear.The anti-verificationist principle above pairs rather nicely with the principle of empiricism, which may also be accepted:b) No hypothesis that has been accepted may be rejected except on the basis of observation or experiment.I don't think that either one of these principles has any obvious implications for Austrian economists. But there may be other methodological principles that do. Any ideas? Again, this is in line with the question implied by Rafe. What actual, practical proposals would critical rationalists make when it comes to methodology?

Methodology should be otvbceije. I think Matt noted that recently. Popper tended to follow this principle.Both praxeologists and Bayesians tend to create prescriptive rules about what one can or should feel about hypotheses given particular circumstances this is more like ethics than methodology. But even Popper's criticism of dogmatism was conducted in an otvbceije manner. The methodological rule against reinforced dogmatisms concerned the otvbceije logical structure of hypotheses and not subjective dispositions. Popper once suggested that a little dogmatism (in the sense of subjective conviction or certainty) may be a good for the social enterprise of science, because all hypotheses deserve thorough and motivated defence. But this should not be confused with advocating hypotheses whose logical structure is such that no criticism can break its layers of deflective stratagies. One may adopt unintentionally adopt a reinforced dogmatism while having a thoroughly critical attitude, because its dogmatic logical structure may go unnoticed.

Lee,Do you have a reference for that? I would be isereenttd in either reading or re-reading that material.Off hand, I do not disagree with what you say. It only seems to add fuel to the fire I'm trying to light, i.e., don't back off from falsificationism'. Even if one accepts direct verification by observation, there is a methodological asymmetry that is persistently overlooked by those who harp on logical symmetry. The methodological asymmetry is this: verifications assume what they verify, and are circular; falsifications assume what they falsify, and are not circular.The point I'm trying to emphasize is that critical rationalism replaces epistemology with methodology. The critics have not picked up on that, for if they did the logical symmetries they keep touting would be recognized as completely irrelevant. Irrelevant!

Propositions of the form all x are y are unverifiable.Propositions of the form some x are y are unifslafiable.Inductivists are continually trying to show how successive observations of some x are y proves, makes credible, or increases the probability of all x are y . But do falsificationists suggest that successive observations of not all x are y disproves, make less credible, or decrease the probability of some x are y ? There is no such symmetry, because falsificationists are not presented with the same problem as inductivists, i.e. verifying universals.

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