A mistaken but recurring theme by some of the commentators to this blog is that modern Austrian economics has been completely taken over by libertarianism and extreme laissez faire. First, I personally think that sound economics should be policy relevant. In other words, engagement in contemporary policy debates on the transition from socialism, the plight of underdevelopment, the dynamics of interventionism, and the manipulation of money and credit is a virtue not a vice. But I also think that if you look closely at the work done by modern Austrian economist on these issues it is decidedly not first-principle libertarianism. It is instead economic consequentialism in nature. The focus is on consequences, not violation of rights per se. And as such is based on economic argument which in turn is grounded in economic theory. [To readers who think economic theory is a dogma I don't really know what to say except read more economics --- a good start for the critically minded might be McCloskey's How to be Human, Though an Economist and in particular her rule #10 -- Learn Price Theory, Which is No Easy Task -- in my experience almost all confusion results from not learning basic price theory, or thinking you learned it when you didn't].
So you don't have to be a libertarian to understand the role that property rights, free price movements, and profit and loss accounting play in guiding resource use, spurring on innovation, and prodding individuals to continually adjust to changing circumstances. You just have to be an economist. Simply put: incentives matter, information is necessary, and institutions structure incentives and determine the flow, and quality of the information communicated.
So this question of institutions is looming always in the background. Most standard price theory treats the institutions as exogenously given, and then examines human behavior within that given environment. Part of the reason why anarchism has become increasingly a topic of professional concern is the desire to move from treating institutions as exogenous to treating them as endogenous.
Significant economists such as Jack Hirshleifer, Avinash Dixit, Raghuram Rajan have argued that we must assume anarchy and examine the "laws of lawlessness" if we want to get a better (more realistic) examination of the economic process of development.
So anarchy research, I have argued, has gone through various intellectual stages in economics and political economy:
1. Romantic anarchism --- associated with William Godwin and basically utopian;
2. Normative anarchism --- associated with Murray Rothbard and focused on the consistent application of natural rights;
3. Positive anarchism --- associated with Bruce Benson, but also Chris Coyne, where the focus is on empirical studies where the institutions of governance are either lacking or extremely weak and the question is how institutions of governance have historically emerged either through private or public means;
4. Analytical anarchism --- associated in contemporary literature with Peter Leeson, where the focus is on how the mechanisms of self-government work with applications to empirical cases.
If my description is accurate, one can see that all the contemporary thinkers within the Austrian camp are focusing on 3 and 4, and not 1 and 2. In short, this is not a libertarian take over, but instead an analytical and empirical examination of endogenous rule creation, formation, evolution and enforcement.
And, it is a research program in economics that links older Austrian ideas (e.g., Mises's central proposition about Ricardo's Law of Association) with modern literature in economics (e.g., the institutions rules debate associated with Acemoglu, Rodrik, Shleifer, etc.).
My current working paper with Pete and Chris entitled Comparative Historical Political Economy lays out the argument for the how and why of this research program. Extreme laissez faire is not mentioned.
Now I can understand how a reader might get confused with a reading only of titles and if they have a set of priors that believe that we cannot distinguish between normative inspirations and analytical examination. As Schumpeter pointed out, there is an important role for ideology in the social sciences by providing the theorist with pre-analytic cognitive material. Ideology can inspire an inquiry, it just cannot substitute for inquiry. The inquiry in all of these exercises is based on "modern subjectivist economics" of Menger, Mises, Hayek, Rothbard, Kirzner and Lachmann, and has roots in the long history of political economy from Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill to Frank Knight to James Buchanan.
So let me speak for myself, though I think it is descriptive of others as well, I am personally of the radical libertarian persuasion, but that provides me with raw material for inquiry. In short, the puzzles and paradoxes I think about are no doubt influenced by this libertarian outlook. But I work very hard to focus my approach to these puzzles and paradoxes on the analytical economics of the matter. I try to follow McCloskey's rules, especially #10, but all of them actually in presenting my argument, and I submit them for academic peer review. The process of peer review is to make sure that ideological influences are held in check, and that the argumentative structure and empirical evidence provided meets professional standards. I have had my share of rejected attempts, they force you back to the drawing board and to rethink the exercise. The secret is to learn from the process, don't become shy due to the process. Being bold is how you push the boundaries of a science, being professionally responsible is how you assure that your boldness is justified.
The contemporary anarchism research is both bold and responsible. It is the readers of this blog that have to get caught up to date with the literature in economics. A good place to start might be my paper "Anarchism as a Progressive Research Program in Political Economy." Of course, a careful reading of any paper by Peter Leeson, or Chris Coyne will do the trick as well. Their papers (and books) are grounded in analytical puzzles concerning the economics of governance, and the empirical examination of situations where the normal institutions of government are either absent or weak, yet social cooperation doesn't collapse to zero. I have not once seen either of them invoke a man-qua-man argument or utter the phrase non-aggression axiom in their work. Instead, it is all about choice theory and the evolution of institutions. And it represents some of the most innovative and important work in the field of political economy.
BTW, congratulations to Pete and Chris for being recognized by the SDAE for the Best Paper (Pete's JPE piece) and Best Book (Chris's Stanford book) for 2008.