Russ Sobel and I have a new paper on democratic failure, "Race, Politics, and Punishment: Democratic Failure in the New Orleans Mayoral Election." To download the paper, click here. Here's the abstract:
This paper empirically evaluates two competing theories of electoral accountability in the context of New Orleans’ 2006 mayoral election. According to the democratic efficiency theory, voters can successfully punish ineffective political agents by removing them from office. In contrast, the public choice theory argues that the bundled nature of political goods prevents voters from successfully holding ineffective politicians accountable. We find that although there is limited support for the punishment effect predicted by the democratic efficiency theory, this effect is overwhelmed by the fact that the bundle of goods politicians offer contains elements that pull in opposing directions. This prevents the punishment effect from having any real impact, leading to democratic failure. Our results support the public choice theory of electoral (un)accountability.
A great advance in Austrian economic theory, indeed. Not even one Austrian vice! Right on!
Posted by: Erick | March 29, 2007 at 03:43 AM
A great advance in Austrian economic theory, indeed. Not even one Austrian vice! Right on!
I like your sense of humour :)
Posted by: Pearl | March 29, 2007 at 08:17 AM
"I like your sense of humour :)"
Hahahaha :)
Posted by: Erick | March 30, 2007 at 12:40 AM