Strangers Nowhere in the World

|Peter Boettke|

That phrase comes from Kant, but it is also the title of an excellent book that I am reading at the moment by Margaret Jacob (U of Penn Press, 2006).  Jacob's book is about the rise of cosmopolitanism in Early Modern Europe.  It is, in short, about the rise of European Liberalism.

This last point I want to stress because too often in the popular media the teachings of the Austrian school are identified with conservative politics when in fact the great Austrian economists, such as Menger, Mises and Hayek were in fact European Liberals.  Radical liberals that opposed intolerance, militarism, and arbitrary state authority.  Yes they were economic liberals, but their views on economic policy were part of a larger world view that followed consistently from an embracing of the cosmopolitanism that Jacob writes about.

For anyone who doubts this, read Mises's Liberalism.  As he says on p. 56, "Liberalism demands toleration as a matter of principle, not from opportunism."  Only toleration, he continues, "can create and preserve the condition of social peace without which humanity must relapse into barbarism and penury of centuries long past."

On colonialism, Mises wrote: "No chapter of history is steeped further in blood than the history of colonialism.  Blood was shed uselessly and senselessly.  Flourishing lands were laid waste; whole peoples destroyed and exterminated.  All this can in no way be extenuated or justified." (see p. 125)

Every sort of national chauvinism is to be rejected, and instead the free mobility of people and goods is to be pursued.  We are to be citizens of the world.  Cosmopolitanism, toleration, trade are the hallmarks of liberalism.  That is what Ludwig von Mises stood for in his politics. 

 

Comments

[Jonathan M. F. Catalán]

Well, let's face it, the "Austrian School" is not a political movement. It's a group of economists who work within a specific framework, studying and applying value-free economic law. I think the Austrian School attracts a wide variety of people, from different areas of the political spectrum. For example, Hoppe strikes me as a conservative, and Cato has done a lot of work attracting conservatives to the libertarian movement based on their economic beliefs.

There may be a tendency to socially liberalize once one has become part of the greater libertarian movement, due to the sheer amount of libertarian scholars who profess tolerance in their writing, but I don't think very many people necessarily consider social conservatism as incompatible with Austrian economics.

[Peter Boettke]

Jonathan,

Please read my last sentence again, I am commenting on Mises's politics. While you are at it, read Rothbard's essay on the search for the historical Mises, which also emphasizes Mises's radical liberal politics.

Pete

[Richard Ebeling]

I might mention that another very good book on this theme is, Thomas J. Schlereth, "The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought" (Notre Dame, In: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).

He traces out the emergence of this trans-national ideal by focusing on the ideas and interactions between Benjamin Franklin, David Hume, and Voltaire.

But the book is more than just an exposition of their inter-related ideas on the cosmopolitan conception of man and ideas. It traces out many of the emerging practices among even governments that there are things of value to all mankind that are greater than the "interests" even of "the state."

As one example, when Captain Cook was undertaking his explorations of the South Seas islands, captains of French men-of-war ships were given instructions that if they ran into him on the high seas they should extent any and all help to him, even though France was at war with Great Britain.

Why? Because Captain Cook's travels were concerned with the extension of scientific knowledge for all mankind -- and that took precedence over the interests of any single nation, even when at war with the country of that pursuer of knowledge.

Pete quotes from Mises' "Liberalism." Mises emphasizes in another passage in that book that the liberal "IS" a cosmopolitan who considers policies from the interests of all mankind, because the logic of the division of labor makes us aware that we are all participants in one global community of interdependent association for betterment (material, cultural) for human beings, everywhere.

And in this, as in many things, Mises was merely following in the footsteps of those great 19th century (classical) liberals who rejected narrow nationalism, imperialism, and wars of conquest and plunder.

How wondrous was that liberal ideal that liberty, peace, and prosperity were interconnected elements in a unified conception of man and the good society.

We can only hope that some day -- maybe in the 23rd century -- that "enlightened" ideal will have a rebirth.

Richard Ebeling

[Michael]

As a serious question I can never quite wrap my head around: Is there anything about cosmopolitanism that is manifestly chauvinistic?

David Hume spends some time with this question although my relationship with his writings is more distant that I would like. It was a great question for the Scottish enlightenment -- why us, why here, why now? It required separating institutional design features from cultural preference. The German Historical school not only rejected David Ricardo but also in a significant way it rejected David Hume...

As Peter B. knows I have often tried to understand his version of cosmopolitanism which seems to delight in the tolerance of "Jersey Shore." While I have learned to accept tolerance as a principle of institutional design, there is something deep in my southern blood that rejects the cultural preference manifest in vastly different preference bundles. I don't consider myself a conservative but it might stick when I make a claim like this.

I think this is what many people see when they see Mises's crankiness. Can we ever disassociate our own preference bundle from our belief in a correct form of institutional design? Going back to a previous post on Rawls, his answer seems to be no -- we are born into a political tradition of righteous respect for justice, there is room for improvement, but we cannot shape it as individuals.

[K Sralla]

I have recently gone back and thought some on Hayek's essay regarding the meaning of Individualism. He traces what he calls a "true individualism" to the British empiricist political philosophers (with special affinity for the Old Whigs)such as John Locke, and later through Adam Smith, David Hume and Edmumd Burke, and contrasted this with what he terms a "false individualism", derived from the continental rationalistic philosophers (Rousseau).

My internal struggle is trying to square Hayek's formulation with the views of either Mises or (especially) Rothbard. In some ways, the Rothbardian school seems to share more in common with continental rationalistic individualism and much less in common with the intellectual line of Adam Smith. IMHO, Rothbard's is a very continental (French) notion not found in Hayek.

In another modern vein, we might even discuss Ayn Rand's objectivism, which I believe is strongly in the the line of continental radical rationalistic philosophy. Why do so many modern libertarians (some of these are even economists) admire Ayn Rand to the extent that do, when her philosophy largely rejects subjectivism and destroys economics? Rand's ideas certainly appear at first glance to have more in common with Hayek's "false" individualism (French) than from the line of the British empiricists. Strange indeed to me, but the confusion may be my own ignorance.

The upshot seems to be that the various streams of modern liberalism (libertarianism) have converged from several directions, and it is very hard to place the history of classical liberalism in a nice neat package under the umbrella of "cosmopolitanism". Yes, a "cosmopolitan" worldview is inherent in much classical liberal thinking, but there are various shades expressed by the different thinkers. Perhaps Hayek represents that "classical liberal" from the British side, where Rothbard was represents a more continental radical stream of liberalism. Kant quite possibly bridges the gap between the two sides with the so-called European cosmopolitanism, but I'm not quite sure.

Hayek even argued that the French brand of liberalism eventually morphs back into an insidious collectivism. Maybe European cosmopolitanism has this same tendency through issues such as the global environmental movement and other "citizen of the world" moralistic posturing??

[Jonathan Finegold Catalan]

Peter,

Your post reflects this thesis, "This last point I want to stress because too often in the popular media the teachings of the Austrian school are identified with conservative politics when in fact the great Austrian economists, such as Menger, Mises and Hayek were in fact European Liberals."

I was commenting on this, not on Mises's politics. The fact is that many Austrian economists are conservatives. The greater point should be that Austrian economics is not about political science, it's about economics, whatever your values may be.

[Roger Koppl]

I don't see how you can really absorb the lessons of economics without wanting cosmopolitanism, toleration, trade, and peace, peace, peace. Down with lofty! Up with vulgar! Nothing lofty has given us our riches, our culture, civilization itself. All the benefits of civilization come from vulgar, banal, pragmatic trade. "Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want." The Greek heroes were lofty. They gained fame and glory by pillage and plunder. Chauvinists and racists are lofty. They protect the "culture" or "way of life" or "race" from "lower" and "baser" elements. I'm against all that.

Let the wretched refuse of their teeming shores come here and trade. We can use the help. Let the pimp and the prostitute ply their trades freely and nonviolently. It will improve the public health. Let homosexuals marry and be happy. If pair bonding is good enough for me, why isn't it acceptable in my trading partners? If society itself is the product of the division of labor, of trade, then there is only one pro-social policy: promote peace, trade, and tolerance.

[Per Bylund]

Fine, Mises was a [classical] liberal - at least in his politics. But it is also true that Mises based his liberal convictions on a utilitarian world view (which is pretty obvious when reading Liberalism), whereas the [classical] liberal ideology is clearly deontological or rights-based.

Granted, utilitarians such as J.S. Mill are often put squarely in the classical liberal camp as well (due, I guess, to their politics). I would, however, claim that James Mill was much, much more of a [classical] liberal than his son...

[Peter Boettke]

Jonathan,

I agree with the position you are stating ... read it in Mises, and published my own version of it in several journals through the years. But the point is that people are trying to tag Austrian economics with a particular political position which is conservative and to identify the school with its historical figures. This is factually wrong.

Also, the teachings of economics --- again as Mises argued --- does lead one to certain positions, such as free trade, etc. Unless one is willing to hold some rather strange preferences for poverty and social strife. Remember Mises argues that liberalism is the consistent application of praxeology to matters of public policy.

I think you might want to go back and look at Mises and also what Richard Ebeling wrote above.

But that economics is a value-free science independent of politics I agree with you 100%.

Pete

[Michael]

Roger,

I agree with you completely. I just have this chauvinistic "intuition" that I can't shake. My fundamental homogeneity assumption tells me that if I can't shake it, it is a common psychological issue. Educating away this intuition might be fundamentally similar and as hard as convincing people that the earth is not the center of anything (something again which I know -- but seems counter-intuitive).

[McKinney]

Remember, also, that economic liberals of the 19th century opposed slavery, for which the science earned the nickname "dismal."

It's also interesting that for much of the 17th and 18th centuries nations at war carried on trade with each other. The first economic blockade I know of happened in the US civil war. Does anyone know of earlier blockades against trade during wartime?

[K Sralla]

"But the point is that people are trying to tag Austrian economics with a particular political position which is conservative and to identify the school with its historical figures"

Then why does Hayek go to great pains to carefully establish the historical link between his particular brand of political economy and that of well-known historical figures?

Hayek clearly places himself in the historical line of the old Whig party. Right or wrong, he ties his economics to his politics.

I guess I don't follow the argument you are making to Jonathan. What are you objecting to?

[Peter Boettke]

Hayek wrote "Why I am not a conservative" for a reason!

[Roger Koppl]

Michael: Ah! Yes, there is something in us that tries to distinguish "Us" from "Them." It's a huge problem. I think the best protections against this problem are free trade and mundane living. I might despise this or that "Them," but if it hurts my pocketbook to act on that feeling I will shrug my shoulders and say "Live and let live." I do not deny, of course, that we must constantly repeat the doctrine of the universal brotherhood of all mankind.

[William Luther]

Milton Friedman seems to have a slightly different view of colonialism.

"If you take the case of Africa, the wheel--the wheel--had not been invented in parts of Africa by the end of the 19th century. The number of people in Africa and their average conditions of life in Africa have been enormous-- have grown enormously as a result of their contacts with the West."

Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xeebU8VhmY

Do you think these positions are at odds?

[Peter]

Ironically, british imperialism harmed the british taypayer but in the light of the insights of new institutional economics it is not unreasonable to claim that it may have been - on the net - beneficial for the conquered population. And not from a paternalistic, but from a liberal perspective, as the Empire spread property rights and other good institutions and created a worldwide regime of free trade. See for example Deepak Lal's "In Praise of Empires", Niall Ferguson's "Empire" or the writings of Peter Bauer and the empirical studies by Acemoglu et al. Thus there is actually a cosmopolitan case for that type of imperialism. Of course all these were primary unintended consequences and other empires in history have not been beneficial at all for humanity

[Richard Ebeling]

In response to the comment by "Michael."

It would be absurd not to admit that our cultural environment, our up-bringing, etc., does not influence and to a great extent "make" us.

But . . . having said this, we remain "rational" creatures, who have the ability to reason, reflect, and re-think our attitudes, beliefs, and values. And to then act differently, both "internally" and "externally."

How else has social change occurred, if not some one (and then others) saying to themselves, "Why this way?" And then attempting to change themselves when they conclude that "the way things are," are not completely how they could be or should be.

And that includes this cosmopolitan ideal.

It is worth recalling that the "national" sentiment is only about 250 years old. Before the French Revolution the modern sense of "nationalism" and loyalty and "sacrifice" for the "nation" did not exist.

Before that, loyalties were to one's local community and to the prince or the king. People's horizons of allegiance expanded from the local to the monarchical, to the "nation" as a whole.

The liberal revolution of the late 18th and the 19th centuries broadened that horizon to the idea of what unified all men, everywhere, as human beings deserving of similar rights to life, liberty, and property, and to international rules of conduct (in peace and war) among citizens and their governments in relation to each other.

The 20th century was a great counter-revolution against the liberal cosmopolitan ideal -- whether it took the form of socialism, communism, fascism, Nazism, or the interventionist-welfare state.

We need to reawaken the (classical) liberal cosmopolitan ideal, once again, so the 21st century -- and beyond -- can be universal once more in its devotion to liberty, peace, and prosperity for all. A common brotherhood of mankind in commerce and shared cultures for mutual betterment and gain.

Richard Ebeling

[Steve Horwitz]

Koppl wins this thread, hands down.

[K Sralla]

Hayek wrote "Why I am not a conservative" for a reason!

I agree Pete, but Hayek was something, and what he was was a self-decribed "Old Whig". The same thing as Burke and Lord Acton.

As you know, Hayek carefully explained that he was not a conservative because the conservative movement was going "nowhere". At best, it could only stand still or be reactionary.

Hayek advocated allowing the classic institutions (such as private property and the family) which had arisen over long periods without conscious human design, to guide the continued evolution of the civial society. He did not want this view labeled "conservative", but it was indeed something akin, and much different from the radical rationalisitic French ideas of individualism.

[Michael]

Richard,

Amartya Sen has a wonderful description of theories of justice and divides them into "transcendental institutionalism" and "realization-focused institutionalism." I find these categories useful tools for thinking about large groups of thought.

If I am not mistaken, your "liberal cosmopolitan ideal" would be comfortable with a transcendent notion. That has great advantages, but also many limitations -- which the assumption of pervasive rationality among one's own tribe might be one key case. You have correctly identified large movements whose popularity and violence identify them as more than theoretical backlashes to cosmopolitanism. Something systematic set them off each time.

I think we are all conservative when it comes to our own idols of the "tribe, cave, marketplace, and theatre" to appropriate Bacon here. What I meant to emphasize is where and how these manifest, not if they exist.

We can certainly choose the "correct" institution, but as Sen worries -- that has too little bearing on the possibility of achieving it.

[Rafe Champion]

Philosopher and libertarian Stephen Hicks has a nice post on the influence of British colonisation on current economic performance. He asks "What special ideas, practices, and institutions did the British bring that gave countries that adopted them great economic advantages?"

http://www.stephenhicks.org/2011/02/10/successful-nations-and-the-british-empire/

What about cricket?

He also has posts on the Fed, Atlas Shrugged, and much more of interest.

Hayek made a nice distinction between patriotism (OK) and nationalism (not OK).

Didn't Britain blockade France during the Napoleonic wars?

Congratulations Roger, and not a word about arithmetic!

[Peter]

Re Hayek's liberalism: I find both libertarians and conservatives to be a bit uneasy about Hayek's strong connection to Burke. Burke is generally called a "conservative". Hayek wrote that he wasn't a conservative but a burkeian whig. For many it is just too confusing. The answer to this contradiction may be one of the following:
- Hayek wasn't a burkeian
- Hayek was indeed a conservative(in the traditional sense)or
- Burke was actually a liberal(in the classical sense), and thus Hayek's interpretation of him was better than that of Russell Kirk.

I would probably go with option 3.

[K Sralla]

My point to Pete Boettke is that his beef is squarely with the modern conservative movement, not with a strand of thought that asserts dogmatically that economics is "values free".

There is no doubt that classical liberalism is incompatible with conservatism in many ways, but these arguments should not be hidden behind a very silly cloak of "values free economics" in one breath, while in the next breath everyone has a combaya moment for "cosmopolitanism" and global morality.

That is smokescreen and a losing argument. It may make academics feel high and mighty, but it does little to spread real education on the historical development of thought to students of economics and/or the public alike.

For the sake of education, I think he and other economists should come clean and state very clearly exactly what their beef is with popular conservatism, much like Hayek does. Where does it go wrong in terms of good economics, and why is a purer classical liberalism more true to the economic way of thinking? I'm certain many scholars that comment here have a very well constructed argument in their mind, but most do a very poor job articulating a coherent reasoned argument.

My own suspision is that there is not a unanimous opinion on where exactly the conservatives diverge philosophically with classical liberalism. I also suspect that there is some lingering suspision among many modern-day self styled classical liberals that Hayek was not liberal enough, and in fact a "conservative in sheeps clothing" despite his denials. How about Polanyi? I have heard Pete say he likes Polanyi, but I'm not sure he was all that liberal either (I love Polanyi too). He seemed in many ways quite conservative in certain areas.

But lets don't hide behind this puny yet arrogant argument that economics is totally "values free". If this is really true, then economics is close to being worthless. I'm not sure anyone really wants to go down this path.

[K Sralla]

...not with a strand of thought that asserts dogmatically that economics is *not* "values free"

maybe this makes my first sentence make more sense.

[K Sralla]

"Yes they were economic liberals, but their views on economic policy were part of a larger world view that followed consistently from an embracing of the cosmopolitanism that Jacob writes about."

At the risk of being labeled a troll and getting run off this site for good, I am going to try again (I'm afraid my last comment was not well formulated) to state my case that some economists are skitsofrenic when it comes to their economics and politics.

The larger worldview that Pete refers above is humanism (of the Enlightenment type), and it is most decidedly *not* values free. If the economic views of Mises follow from his humanism, it is very tenuous to hold that the economics practiced by Mises was "values free". I think it is quite a weak argument.

Now that I have established my case here, I want to move on the next item. There may in fact be several quite different strands of humanism from whence the sprig of contemporary Austrian economics sprouts.

As stated above, this issue revolves around the various Enlightenment philosophical traditions as practiced in Britain and on the continent. One led in the direction of collectivism, and the other in the direction of "classical liberalism". I'm not sure but that the "European cosmopolitanism" of which the author writes (that of Kant) is not closer to the later continental strand that leads back to collectivism. I think the cosmopolitanism of (say Hayek and Polanyi as type examples) were much more "conservative" than the radical brand of the continental thinkers. I'm not sure about my case here, but somewhat suspicious that I may be right.

I am sure that my thesis will not be popular here, but I throw it out as food for thought.

[Rafe Champion]

Burke was a free trader and his conservatism was a reaction to the anarchy of the French revolution, a plea for continuity and a defence of valuable traditions. Strange that social conservatism is scorned by the kind of people who are obsessed with conserving natural habitats.

Science and positive economics is/are value free in the sense that the truth of descriptive propositions is not determined by values. Mises and many others assert the value freedom of science while at the same time holding personal values and policy preferences. No contradiction.

How come value-free knowledge is worthless?

[K Sralla]

Rafe, value is subjective. That is to human beings. While this proposition is universally true, it can only be meaningful in the sense that the value of which we speak is a human value.

Therefore the truth that "value is subjective" cannot be made in a vaccum, as the proposition only makes sense in terms of human values.

Therefore, economics without human values, or put another way, "value free economics" is meaningless.

Now, if I assert that E=MC^2, that is something else. It operates with or without regard to how I think about it.

I'm willing to stand corrected if I'm wrong.

[Thomas.th]

I think the general confusion about the term "liberalism" stems from the fact that liberalism is part of the progressive movement and thus not really a fixed political position but more like a political vector. Over at least the last 250 years the political center shifted gradually to the left and political positions that once were considered left are now considered right.
American liberals really are the heirs of past liberals, even if they don't support the same positions anymore. But the underlying idea -destruction of existing priviliges- is still the same. So called "classical liberals" like Mills were fighting against aristocratic privileges. Modern liberals often fight against priviliges due to the uneven allocation of property rights. I absolutely agree with you that the first fight tended to make people economically better off (at least on average) while the second probably doesn't, but it is still the same principle at work.

As to the Mises quote: I love Mises to death, so I tell myself that Mises would be the first person to aknowledge that he was wrong with this contention. He just never had the doubtful joy to experience post-colonialism and the rise of the third-world. How today anybody could consider the third world better than colonialism is really quite beyond me. I suppose it requires either a seriously warped view of colonialism or an absolutely perverted preference scale.

[Steve Horwitz]

K:

You misunderstand what is meant by "value-free economics" which is demonstrated by your use of the term "values-free" (note the plural). No one is saying that economics doesn't consider values. The phrase "value-free" in Mises's system simply refers, as Pete points out above, to the idea that when we do economic analysis we simply look at the relationship between means and ends: will the preferred policy being analyzed achieve the ends that those who are promulgating it believe it will? It is "value free" because we are not asking whether the end in question is desirable or not, rather we are asking whether the means will fit the end.

That's a very different idea than the one you seem to be criticizing: that somehow Pete is arguing there are no "values" in economics. Mises ends his book with the claim that ignoring economics means the end of civilization. He's got a ton of values in your sense in that book, but that's a different issue from claiming economic analysis is "value free."

[Peter Boettke]

K. Sralla,

Not a troll, but I think the issue you raise about value freedom, etc. is complicated and I try to address them in my essay "Why No Austrian Socialists?" and also in another essay dealing with what I call approximate value-freedom to real value relevance. Basically, political economy is a value relevant discipline I argue to the extent, and only to the extent, that economics science provides objective knowledge.

Now, the context of this post is really focused on the political sensibilities of the leading historical figures of the Austrian school of economics. Recently many critics have attempted to claim that Austrian economists are far right outside of the mainstream of decent political discourse. I am simply suggesting this is not true. The main political sensibilities of the leading figures -- Menger, Mises, and Hayek -- are European Liberalism, a doctrine that, as Kant argued, strove for a world where diverse individuals were seen as "strangers nowhere in the world."

To me all moves away from this cosmopolitan position need to be explained, because Menger, Mises and Hayek, tried to provide not natural law defenses of their position, but consequentialist arguments. In short, they provided economic arguments for their political sensibilities. I find their argument persuasive, and if anything not consistently pursued enough. But the bottom line, I don't really understand how an economist, if they believe their economics, could in fact hold a set of policies that cut against the cosmopolitanism that Kant is talking about in that phraseology, or that Mises makes when discussing social cooperation under the division of labor, and free trade.

Pete

[Roger Koppl]

K: Value-referring, value-motivated, and value-laden are 3 different things. The doctrine of value freedom just says that economic theory is not value laden. It is not a way to say "we" or *you* should do this or that. The propositions of economic theory are like E=Mc^2, true with or without regard to how I think about it.

[Mario Rizzo]

That economics is "value free" in Mises's sense isn't a live issue anymore. Only misunderstanding can produce controversy here.

The disagreements among economists relate to the applicability of different theories, which is no simple matter in a complex world. Even with many of Mises's value judgments (qua citizen or qua political philosopher) we are not necessarily led to classical liberalism.

Mises's claims about what economics *unambigously* teaches about the world are quite extravagant, even for a person like me who largely agrees with Mises.

[Troy Camplin]

There's a great deal of term confusion, particularly in the U.S., when it comes to politics. I discuss this confusion here:

http://zatavu.blogspot.com/2011/02/libertarian-left.html

Hayek comes across as a "traditionalist", typically understood as "conservative" because he argues for gradualist social evolution rather than revolutionary social evolution. Thus, he is neither a revolutionary not a conservative/traditionalist, because he argues not for the retention of tradition, but for social evolution within the context of tradition. Change, yes, but change with continuity.

[Current]

> http://zatavu.blogspot.com/2011/02/libertarian-left.html

Nice post.

[K Sralla]

Troy: I agree with you 100%. Your interpretation of Hayek's position and mine are exactly the same, and I think that is precisely consistent with my comments above. I sincerely see no confusion on this point.

To Pete, Steve, Roger, and Mario: I very much appreciate each of your responses. I am in the middle of a busy workday and will think more carefully about what you have stated tonight when I have more time to think, maybe over a nice beverage.

[Barkley Rosser]

McKinney,

First, Napoleon blockaded the British from dealing with continental Europe as part of his "Continental System," to which the British responded by blockading French ships from sailing anywhere, all of this more than a half century prior to the US Civil War.

[Rafe Champion]

Thanks Barkley!

A second thought on cricket as the key institution that Great Britain spread around the world to account for the economic performance of ex-colonies (as per the Stephen Hicks link above).

Check out the current list of cricket-playing nations.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Cricket_World_Cup#Format

The US is no longer on the list, although the first international cricket games were played between Canada and the US.

[K Sralla]

Peter Boettke,

Either I am now very confused, or this argument is incoherent. You seem to be arguing alternately that in Misesian economics, normative propositions (cosmopolitanism) at times ground value-free economics, then at other times that value free economics ground the normative propositions, then at other times that economics is value free period.

Certainly in Roger Koppl's usage that everyone here seemed to love, the normative and positive are conflated frontward and backward, and nobody seemed to bat an eye. Well my eyes blurred shut. Then again, I'm very tired and its quite late.

What am I missing here?

[Rafe Champion]

What is the problem? Pete's post was about the classical liberal values of the Austrian founding fathers, humanitarians, cosmopolitans, at home anywhere in the world, even New Zealand and Alabama.

"Radical liberals...opposed intolerance, militarism, and arbitrary state authority. Yes they were economic liberals, but their views on economic policy were part of a larger world view that followed consistently from an embracing of the cosmopolitanism that Jacob writes about."

That is to dispell the myth that Austrians favour sinister and reactionary policies and so their economic theories should be dismissed on ideological grounds.

Moving on to the value freedom issue: It is claimed that the scientific credibility of Austrian economics has to be decided on scientific grounds because the propositions of science are true or false regardless of ideological considerations (and regardless of the difficulty of establishing their truth or falsity). As Roger pointed out.

"The propositions of economic theory are like E=Mc^2, true with or without regard to how I think about it."

You don't have to be an Austrian to be a classical liberal, but it helps.

[Current]

> You seem to be arguing alternately that in
> Misesian economics, normative propositions
> (cosmopolitanism) at times ground value-free
> economics, then at other times that value free
> economics ground the normative propositions,
> then at other times that economics is value
> free period.

In my view normative propositions don't ground economics in any way.

Economics is about what happens in certain situations, logical and empirical propositions, about what is. That comes first, then after looking at that we can look at some set of moral aims, a set of oughts. We can then look at how plans to achieve those aims relate to economic knowledge. "Value-free" economics doesn't become somehow value-loaded in that last step. And discussing the values of Austrian Economists doesn't establish that their economic propositions aren't value-free.

[Roger Koppl]

K: We are like doctors who favor people over germs. The science that tells us surgeons "should" wash their hands before operating is value free science. I don't see how you can really absorb the lessons of modern medicine without wanting surgeons to wash their hands. Is that view contrary to the view that medical science tells us value free truths?

[Michael]

That is a helpful example Roger. Thank you.

[K Sralla]

Here is what is not bothering me: Mises's liberalism. I also consider myself a classical liberal and a citizen of the world.

Here is what is bothering me: An incoherent philosphical grounding of praxeology by Mises. Many others much smarter than me make this charge from inside the Austrian tradition. This is not unimportant, and much of what Hayek is trying to do in Individualism and Economic order is to establish a firmer foundation under the theory of acting man. Hayek starts not with Kant as had Mises, but with the British empiricists.

My proposal: Mises was right for the wrong reasons. That is where I have been trying to go (not very successfully) with all this.

[Daniel J. D'Amico]

I think perhaps that the positive normative distinction is doing a dis-service in the above discussion. The concerns with an objective or universal or essentialist understanding of economics as definitively positive or negative, or the concerns with what foundational relationships exist between the positive and normative features of economics - remind me of Hayek's descriptions in the Counter Revolution of Science that a fear of humanism might be appropriate in the physical sciences; but by purging the conscious acting component in social science means ignoring the very thing trying to be understood.

It seems reasonable to say that economics is positive in so far as we do not debate ends but presume them as given and debate primarily about means. Which is to say it is not a matter of economics to favor one moral principle over another. But it would be foolish to ignore the fact that people do in fact pursue ends and have moral perspectives. Economics is positive rather than normative but should not be considered non- or anti-normative.

All individuals pursue ends. To the extent that consistent and reliable patterns of human decision making exist it seems reasonable to recognize that some and often times many individuals share similar ends. Another way Hayek describes this is that interest groups perceive the world similarly. They evaluate processes of cause and effect and the magnitudes of costs and benefits similarly and thus they share patterns of action and evoke similar responses to stimuli.

Here I'm thinking of liberalism as a sort of social ethic similar to Kirzner's "Coordination as a Criteria of Social Goodness." If one insists upon designing a social welfare criteria (which perhaps might be impossible in purely positive terms) then it must live up to certain logical standards given the way that society functions. The case for economics as not non-normative, could be thought of similarly. If one believes that the observed level of social cooperation throughout society implies that a shared common intention can be applied to all forms of human behavior, then liberalism and individualism seem compelling standards for social ethics. Hayek's generality norm seems to ask, does the standard appear in-offensive to any individual or group within society? Liberalism and Hayek agree that liberty passes this test.

Am I confused?

[Current]

Just going back to an earlier comment....

I don't see what Classical Liberalis, or Economics, has to do with celebrating things like "Jersey Shore". The existence of things like Jersey Shore demonstrates the decadence of western culture, let's be frank about it, it's an embarrassment. Just as Simon Cowell, Piers Morgan and their TV shows are for British people.

Tolerating things isn't the same as approving of them. In Classical Liberalism we draw a line similar to the line drawn by the law of guilt "beyond reasonable doubt". We propose to do something about things that which falls on the wrong side of that line, and tolerate the rest. But, that toleration need not imply approval. Just as a juror may believe that a defendent probably committed the crime, but that the evidence is too circumstantial.

[McKinney]

KSralla, Do you think Human Actions shows "incoherent philosphical grounding of praxeology by Mises"? I certainly don't.

Mises recast economics as an a priori science, like geometry. And Hayek didn't like that approach. He like a more empirical approach. But I don't see the two approaches as contradictory but complementary. Logical truth should also be evident in empirical data, and empirical data needs logic and theory to organize it and make sense of it.

[K Sralla]

McKinney,

When we talk about "a priori", that is a very loaded term. In the popular vernacular it means one thing, in Immanuel Kant's version(s) something else, and to Descartes something else. Mises certainly does not ground his theory of human action on the same foundation as we would ground the notion that 2+2=4, but rather on the sort of moderate rationalism of Kant.

Mises uses the term “a priori” in a highly nuanced sense. I would argue his sense is incoherent (at least to mortal minds). This ends up cascading off into all sorts of very deep issues, and ultimately relates to the relationship between value-free and normative economics and whether the distinction between the two (at least as Mises viewed them) is real.

I do not pretend to be qualified to lecture on the very technical aspects of these foundations, but I have read enough philosophy and history of thought to know that there are many very hard questions raised by Mises’ propositions.

In the end however, I think I bit off more than I can chew with some of these questions, especially in light of Pete's original thread topic (where I completely agree with the basic conclusion that Mises was not a right winger).

There is probably a great thesis topic in here somewhere, but unfortunately at this stage in my life, I probably will not be writing it up.

[Roger Koppl]

Alfred Schutz used to complain that Mises had not really clarified his philosophical position. Schutz was trying to bolster Misesian economics by shoring up is philosophical foundations. So I think it's true that Mises is hard to pin down on these issues. I don't really see how that messes up the value-free idea, which we can get from Weber directly rather than from Weber via Mises. OTOH, Weber was another one whose philosophical foundations were not entirely clear.

[Rafe Champion]

Unfortunately Mises did not have the opportunity to read Barry Smith's take on the philosophy that underpins Austrian economics, which he calls "fallibilistic apriorism". By a stroke of good fortune this coincides with Popper's reading of the philosophy of the natural sciences, which can be called "conjectural apriorism" or indeed fallibilistic apriorism.

http://www.the-rathouse.com/WritingsonMises/FallibleApriorism.html

Thanks to Smith and Popper, Austrian economists can give up the unfortunte terminology of strong or dogmatic apriorism and be confident that they are operating with impeccably scientific methods. It seems that the methods of natural and social science are the same at the meta level of testing and critical evaluation, while the contents of the theories are different (of course, as they are different in different fields of natural science).

All the others can be challenged to read Smith and Popper and get into step. Barry Smith is now my second favorite philosopher. Sorry Bertrand!

[Daniel J. D'Amico]

Dear Current,

I am in no way shape or form embarrassed to say that I watch every episode of the Jersey Shore at least three times and have thus concluded that it is the greatest television show ever made in the entire universe.

I implore you to consider that you might be mistaken on the merits of the show and invite you to watch again.

Sincerely,

DJD

[Michael]

Current,

If the best defense of libertarianism or cosmopolitanism is that tolerance is not equal to approval, then that really doesn't do the job.

I can tolerate many things that I find to be morally repugnant. One of the interesting things about living in society is that we constrain each other's actions on a variety of margins. It should be added that constraints create predictable patterns and the number of constraints necessary is non-zero. This is the idea behind contracts and property rights.

For instance, consider the difference between toleration as a permissive act and toleration as cowardly behavior:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_they_came%E2%80%A6

As the famous poem shows, many people have defended tolerance, but we all know where our lines of justice and righteousness are. These emanate from a preferences. Telling me what I should be willing to die for is strange. For cosmopolitans, people that deny the consensus view about some common core are outside of that concept of righteousness. It is quasi-religious. To somehow assume that "cosmopolitans" as a tribe are above moral repugnance, to me at least, is morally repugnant.

The majority of the world exists in an unenlightened state vis-a-vis cosmopolitanism. It seems we are on shaky ground at best to assume we can deduce a preference order for the majority of the world. This is the vice of the ivory tower. I am too egalitarian for that version of cosmopolitanism. Perhaps better is the view I get from Mises in both Socialism and Liberalism as well as in Adam Smith that the best way to convince others of our understanding is to appeal to their self-interest -- not to call them rubes.

This is a long walk to say that I agree with the fruit of cosmopolitanism, but I don't agree with the self-righteousness that comes with it. E.g. Bono from U2 might be a cosmopolitan, but I retain the right to disagree with his understanding of the world. What I fear is that people will --burn me at the stake-- for not agreeing that charity develops the third world.

I want the latitude to be skeptical of the cosmopolitans.

[Troy Camplin]

Might Hayek in The Sensory Order be providing the neurostructural argument for Mises's apriorism? The mind has a logical structure, and thus from it eminates aprioristic logic?

[Rafe Champion]

I think in Human Action Mises invoked the idea of evolution to account for the structure of the mind that underpinned praxeology, but that does not provide the warrant that is demanded by strong apriorism. Nothing can.

[Current]

Michael,

I don't really understand what you've said.

First you write: "As the famous poem shows, many people have defended tolerance, but we all know where our lines of justice and righteousness are. These emanate from a preferences."

Which is fair enough, then straight after that you write:
"Telling me what I should be willing to die for is strange."

I don't really see how it is. Discussing what we should or should not tolerate is very important. Isn't it irresponsible not to have an opinion about it? Of course I don't approve of ramming that opinion down other people's throats.

"For cosmopolitans, people that deny the consensus view about some common core are outside of that concept of righteousness. It is quasi-religious. To somehow assume that 'cosmopolitans' as a tribe are above moral repugnance, to me at least, is morally repugnant."

I don't understand this bit either. When did I assume that cosmopolitans are beyond moral repugnance? That wasn't my argument at all I was just arguing for a little honest disapproval. I say "honest" because I think everyone here would have something to say if their daughter came home with a douchebag.

[Current]

DJD,

When I go to America I'm always sure to buy some yoghurt so I have some culture to remember.