February 2012

Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
      1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9 10 11
12 13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
26 27 28 29      
Blog powered by TypePad

« What do the uprisings of Egypt tell us about our theory of political revolution? | Main | A Proposed Fix for a Balance Sheet Recession? »

TrackBack

TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d83451eb0069e20147e21c45fa970b

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Anarchy, Order, and/or Chaos in Egypt?:

Comments

Feed You can follow this conversation by subscribing to the comment feed for this post.

Very glad to see this and to see you say this. A lot of people have tendency to see self-government as a deceptive or oxymoronic phrase, but this is how self-governments evolve. The committees of correspondence formed the backbone of the Continental Congresses which gave rise to our own institutions of self-governance and constitutional order. The juxtaposition of legitimate self-governance with emergent order is a very dangerous own. Self-government evolves.

I also saw this on the live Al Jazeera feed. It was fascinating to watch. The reporter was beside herself and kept saying with great surprise, "It appears here that the people are policing themselves!"

I visited Egypt early this week. I went to the El Fayoum oasis to visit farmers. It's small scale farming. Each farmer owns about one acre. I learned there that water right conflicts are sorted out among the farmers without asking the involvement of the state. The head of the farmers association acts as the arbitrator. Rules are based on tradition. Another interesting case in Egypt probably not much researched yet.

Daniel,

Having read your comments on this post at your own blog, I just want to note that nowhere in my short post do I argue that the emergence of these self-governance processes and institutions is to be "contrasted" with the state. All I said was that "in the absence of any legitimate state" these sorts of things are happening. No libertarian anarchist denies that we need institutions for enforcing the rules.

The question of whether there are important ethical and efficiency differences between the processes by which rules are enforced in smaller self-governing areas and the larger modern state is a separate question.

My libertarian anarchist friends quite rightly point to examples like this indicating the ability and desire for people to get together, when the state is in chaos, to defend themselves and their property rights. It also happened in China during the Tiananmen Square uprising.

However, must I remind people of the difference between equilibrium and disequilibrium outcomes? I do not believe that a complex, large, modern society will settle on neighborhood (or private competitive) protection as an equilibrium. It will be a state.

This does not mean that the state will of necessity be large,of course, but it will be a state. Obviously, I will not argue the case here. But the lack of any major civilization without a state should give people pause.

I do not object to people doing research about private protection, courts, etc. The absolute minimum of services that must be provided by a state is not known. No doubt, many particular, contingent cultural factors will play a large role. So broad generalizations may not be possible.

But, please, don't jump to *grand* conclusions on the basis on situations like Egypt now or the pirate stories.

So I guess I agree with Steve.

Steve - ya definitely... when I wrote "which suggests..." I wanted to make clear on there that that's not how I would interpret it - that this is how liberal states emerge, after all. I think I was right in noting that the state to which you refered to was the existing Mubarak state? So no, I wasn't claiming you were making the alternative argument so much as stressing what I think oughta be emphasized. I wanted to clarify what your post might be suggestive of - not declare that that's what you were saying. I definitely like the post.

Some people really do make this juxtaposition though and miss precisely the process by which liberal institutions emerge. That's why I thought it was so important to highlight (and link to!).

Self-government is a contradiction. Government is a gang of marauders, which steals from certain people called tax payers, and then uses the proceeds to police them, making sure to outlaw competitive police forces. In doing so, the so-called government sometimes commits mayhem and murder, and occasionally destroys and/or steals their property.
Its transgressions and murders are sanctificed by a so-called constitution and a statute book, neither of which are consistent with natural rights, common law, and liberty.

If people want a state, they will have one. In the context of revolution, they are not in the mood for a state. Unless many atrocities occur during the revolution, which then would discredit statelessness. It depends on how much restraint from rapine is institutionalized, which could be said to ride the wave of how prominent cooperative society is. I don't believe "Pirate Stories" are something we can point to and yell "see! see!" and rest our case, but that doesn't mean we throw out anarchy because pirates belong in the basket labeled "trite". The patterns we find in each small case like Iceland in the Middle Ages, or Pre-Norman England, or Somalia is another section of wall we add to our defense. And that fact that everywhere people live under a state does not indicate an inevitable equilibrium. In fact I'm sure a lot of the blame can be placed in the hands of the European colonial powers, who introduced states to so many places. Would there be African countries or pacific islands with states if not for them? And was it inevitable that they would be conquered by the colonists? Conquest itself was disequilibrium which brought about a completely new equilibrium of institutionalized states. I would say revolution is a de-conquesting event that could very well end up as a cooperative society, so long as cooperation is already prevalent. Let's see how much the Egyptians love each other.

A similar phenomenon occured in 2001 in Algeria when the region of Kabylia revolted. The demonstrators burned pretty much all police departments in the region, and "neighborhood watch" type of militias spontaneously appeared. Unfortunately then the government was able to use propaganda to discredit this revolt using the ethnic conflict between Algerians of Kabyle descent and Arab descent. The revolt thus remained effectively confined to Kabylia.

As someone who spent the past week in Cairo (I was supposed to start a translating job today, but that's been postponed indefinitely, and am now safely in Rome), it was really fascinating to watch. It was moving to see communities come together -- the sheer size of the average apartment block in Cairo prevents most neighbors from knowing others in the building -- regardless of religious or political differences. It was also an interesting case study in the spread of information, as Saturday night was rather violent, and Sunday night rather calm, as looters learned the costs of trying to attack most areas.

Sports Illustrated's $0.02, Egyptian soccer clubs and their role in the uprising (http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/writers/dave_zirin/01/31/egypt.soccer/index.html)- it's a little fluffy but here's an interesting nugget: "Egypt's most prominent team, Al Ahly, started its club in 1907 as a place to organize national resistance against British colonial rule. The word Al Ahly translated into English means "the national," to mark their unapologetically political stance against colonialism."

The Gaelic Athletics Association has been very important in promoting nationalism in Ireland. In the past a member of the GAA couldn't play other sports such as Rugby and Soccer if he did he would be disqualified.

Only a few years ago they lent one of their grounds in Northern Ireland for a Sinn Fein rally.

The comments to this entry are closed.