Does Finding the Work in Your Discipline to Be Misguided Mean You Should Find Another Discipline?

Loren Lomasky is visiting GMU this week.  Over dinner he asked me and a group of graduate students the following question.  "Who besides people at GMU, and who are not market-oriented in the economics profession are doing good work?"  The way Loren framed the question it meant we were dealing with guys like Stiglitz, Summers, etc.  Loren also pushed the behavioral line of research.  But the students responded by pointing to Vernon Smith's Nobel address, and other criticisms of the behavioral critique.

Loren was not impressed and kept pushing the students and me to think more broadly.  And, in fact, said at one point that if he thought the literature in his discipline was so fundamentally misguided he would stop being a philosopher.

At this point, I realized there was a fundamental failure of communication going on. But I couldn't get my point across, though I did hint at it.  First, in Loren's own discipline he is an analytic philosopher, but there is also a continental approach to philosophy.  Analytic philosophers in general are not very impressed with the work (old or new) done by continental philosophers.  If the profession in general was continental in orientation, then Loren might have the same assessment of philosophy that Austrian economists have of their discipline.  Second, if we move beyond the issue of Austrian economics within the current intellectual landscape of the economics profession and instead just concentrate on the idea of the basic teachings of economics, then there is another issue which I believe Loren was missing --- namely, the difference (in Lakatosian terms) between the hard core and the protective belt.  One can be intellectually open and engaged in a progressive research program, and not be focused on self-criticism inside of the hard core.  Instead, the act of criticism and innovative trial and error is all directed at questions at the edge of the protective belt.  Loren kept asking questions which were inside the hard core of the economic way of thinking, so his disappointment at lack of critical engagement with the graduate students may very well have been a false expectation of how economists debate progress in their discipline.

Finally, Loren artificially rigged the discourse?  Work by political economists such as Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, Besley, Shleifer, Glaeser, etc. were ruled out of court.  Moreover, Greif, Benson, and others on self-ordering was ruled out of court.  We didn't talk about John List on natural experiments, nor Esther Duflo on radomized experiments in policy evaluation, nor Michael Kremer on push versus pull in scientific funding, nor Roland Fryer on incentives in educational policy.  Some of these weren't thought of because of the way Loren posed the problem (focusing not on interesting work, but on interesting work that argues for positive role of government in economic life), others weren't thought of because they actually are market-oriented contributions to economics.

Still Lomasky's challenge is worth contemplating?  Who is indeed doing the most interesting work outside of our intellectual comfort zone?

Comments

[knapp]

Post Keynesians, especially Paul Davidson's work on the endogenous uncertainty in markets.

[Greg Ransom]

I guess I don't understand what is going on in this post, what Lomasky was driving at, and what your question is.

What's an "intellectual comfort zone"?

[Bob Murphy]

For what it's worth, when I was younger I was dead certain I wanted to spend the rest of my life as a college professor.

The journal publication process disillusioned me a lot.

It was 80% due to my difficulty finding a tenure track position, but 20% of why I left academia was that I thought it was not the best use of my efforts. (Of course that does not at all reflect on what other people should decide to do with their lives and their love of Austrian economics. Division of labor, blah blah blah, you know the drill.)

[Nick Curott]

I took part in this discussion and I have to admit that I found it a bit confusing. Professor Lomasky seemed to be saying that I wasn't open minded because I thought economists should use methodological individualism and purposiveness as the starting points of analysis. In my mind rejecting those postulates would be to reject economics as such. Then he asked me to name a good economist who is neither free market oriented nor uses the economic way of thinking. I couldn't think of one. To me that is almost a contradiction in terms. How can an economist be good if he uses a poor method and also comes to conclusions that I disagree with. I am still baffled.

[Bogdan Enache]

Carlota Perez : http://www.carlotaperez.org/index.htm

[David Andersson]

Some "mixed-economy" economists with interesting ideas:

Geoff Hodgson
Ted Burczak
Warren Samuels
Amartya Sen
Thomas Schelling
Warren Samuels
Tony Lawson
etc.

There are many more.

(This list represents 30 seconds of thinking about the question, it's not a ranking!)

[Chris]

Invoking Lakatosian terms in a defense of economics is bold, given Spiro Latsis's Lakatosian attack on Milton Friedman's work as pseudo-scientific.

And you seem to be saying that progress in economics takes place within the protective belt. In terms of Lakatosian theory, that kind of progress is characteristic of a degenerating research program.

Also, continental theory is making its way into modern Anglo-American philosophy (especially in areas like embodied cognition, nonrepresentationalist theories of the mind, and (the philosophical end of) robotics, to name a few). I don't understand your point here, anyway, and believe it has no bearing on the health of economics.

Philosophers, unlike economists, are not under the illusion that they are scientists and tend not to look down on other non-scientists and on non-academics the way economists do. That kind of attitude is probably healthy in natural science but very destructive in non-science (like economics) in which a hard core of sorts is likely to be determined via an arbitrary process as opposed to by a process that aims at truth

John Kay had an interesting article in the Financial Times three days ago on "How economics lost sight of real world." In it he wrote that, "Most economists would claim that the project has been a success. But the criteria are the self-referential criteria of modern academic life." So it's not just non-economists who are starting to smell a rat.

And I still find it weird and a bit rude that you implied (quite clearly) that Ray Monk's relationship to Wittgenstein is like that of a car salesman to an engineer, when Ray Monk is himself a professor of philosophy. If you made a mistake in thinking that Ray Monk is not an academic, that just confirms that you can't tell the difference between a book written by an academic well-versed in the literature and the peer-review process, and one that is not. Ray Monk was your example, not mine.

Especially considering how most economists use "philosophy" as a term of abuse (not Austrians, I know), is it really all that surprising that most philosophers with an interest in methodology are going to look at economics with a sense of bemusement?

[David Andersson]

This is actually an interesting question:
"Does Finding the Work in Your Discipline to Be Misguided Mean You Should Find Another Discipline?"

The answer, I think, is no.

But then there is this question:
Does Finding the Work in Your Discipline to Be Irrelevant Mean You Should Find Another Discipline?

Then I would say yes.

Some clarification is in order:

I endured a year in an economics department around 10 years ago, and discovered that they were doing mathematics which did not seem to relate to the real world at all, judging from various seminars that I attended(mostly advanced game theory). So I decided that I would not like to work at a math-obsessed economics department, because it seems totally irrelevant if the goal is better understanding of various social processes.

On the other hand, much of what goes on in departments of business, management, planning, sociology, geography, law, political science etc. is perhaps misguided - at least from an Austrian or quasi-Austrian point of view - but it is clearly not irrelevant: they're interested in the real world. In addition, they tend to be much more tolerant of epistemological/methodological non-conformists than in economics departments (I mean in general, I'm not referring to GMU).

Of course this might be easier for someone with a PhD in another field than economics, even though his dissertation was in empirical economics (I'm describing myself). This is the only way I can make sense of the focus on Economics, AER, JPE, QJE that so often infects this blog. Does this mean that they - the AE bloggers - would rather publish in the AER than, say, a journal with a higher impact in some other discipline? My impression is that they would, but doesn't this imply that they think that economics (as it is practiced by the mainstream) has a sounder methodology than all other disciplines? Or is it because they believe that a "great economist" is much greater than a "great social scientist" or even a "great scientist"?

[Roger Koppl]

I dunno, Pete, I think Lomasky must have caught you out in an odd moment or something. I'm not sure I see the issue. Would any of us deny that, say, Kenneth Arrow is great? Or Akerlof? Or Shiller? Or, really, most econ omists who are widely cited? You’re attacks on Stiglitz are at the same time appreciations of him, aren’t they? I just don’t see that Austrians shun economists whose politics, methods, or conclusions they do not share.

And, you know, we live this stuff. Austrians have relatively close professional relationships with various economists who are more or less “left.” Barkley Rosser, Gary Mongiovi, Dave Colander, Warren Samuels, and Ted Burczak leap to mind instantaneously, but the list is much longer. I’m just not sure I get the issue, Pete.

Nick Curott's report is revealing. A good economist who does not use the economic method? Isn't that kind of a trap? If I nominate, say, Etizioni, then I'm saying his non-marginalist approach to moral choice violates the economic method, which would seem to be a damnation of it and rule it out of court. OR I'd have to say I merely prefer the economic method (undefined apparently) although it has no special claim on others. "Gotcha!" That's not serious discourse, is it? I'm not sure I see a serious issue emerging from that conversation, Pete.

[Bogdan Enache]

Professor Koppl,

I believe Loren Lomasky's question was more along this line : "No philosopher takes THE philosophical method of Plato or of Wittgenstein and so on, as THE foundational modus operandi and THE ultimate framework of reference in which he has to see the world, at least in its essence if not necessarily in the degree of sophistication of its expression; no philosopher would define philosophy by as virtually unquestioned and unquestionable given approach - in other disciplines the fundamentals are more diversed and the "method of the discipline" as it were is often put into question in the process of scientific progress". I tend to agree with the point take economists cherish more virtuosity in the many ways the old supply and demand can be graphed, differentiated, integrated, regressed, progressed and so on than self-reflection and possible fundamental reconsiderations. One reason Keynes was so influential, for instance, is because he managed to make economists think that he discovered a more prodigious theoretical and instrumental arsenal than the old "parrot line" of supply and demand; he gave the impression - partly justified, of course - that he achieved a fundamental renovation in economic analysis, economcis science.

[Peter Boettke]

First, I said "edge" of the protective not inside. Second, I suggest individuals read Vernon Smith's defense of experimental economics on Lakatosian grounds. Morevoer, Mario Rizzo's defense of Misesianism on Lakatosian grounds might be worth your while.

Second, I think again readers are missing the point. Loren wasn't looking for heterodox people, he kept refering to the folk at Harvard, MIT, Chicago, etc. He wanted to know mainstream people, outside of our comfort zone (methodologically and ideologically) and YOUNG.

In short, what 35 year old or young economist is really making you say "wow" when you read them. And if you cannot say "wow" even when you disagree how sad for you.

But he made the task very narrow --- individuals who are very smart, who are challenging the economic model of man, who reject the self-ordering property of the market, who publish in the mainstream journals and teach at the top universities, etc., and who we find so impressive we say "wow". Not being to name such a person is NOT an indictment, it may in fact be a null set by construction of the question.

Names most of the readers have given, are in fact of an older generation, and don't fit the parameters of Loren's question. For example, Jesse Shapiro wouldn't count on his list, though in fact many at the table would have listed his name if allowed (and the names I mentioned).

Finally, I think David Anderson raises an important point. I can only speak for myself, and I am conflicted on this issue of economics and other disciplines. On the one hand, I am convinced that Austrian economics is first and foremost ECONOMICS. On the other hand, guys like Mises and Hayek always argued that nothing is as dangerous as an economist who only does economics. So I think economists should be doing interdisciplinary research in philosophy, politics, sociology, history, and the history of ideas. But I also think that we will advance the set of ideas we care about best when we publish in the highest ranked journals in all the fields and with the best publishers.

Does that clarify my position at least?

[Roger Koppl]

Is Mullainathan young enough for this game? "Are Emily and Brendan More Employable than Latoya and Tyrone?" Wow! You mentioned Duflo who is pretty young. I like a lot of the "behavioral" stuff notwithstanding my preference for V. Smith over Thaler and Cosmides over Kahneman.

[Daniel J. D'Amico]

Not to sound intransigent, but I'll bet Loren and most GMU students have a different interpretation for what constitutes being "free market." Caplan's work would imply that the average economists is significantly more free market than the average person. In other words if free market just means that the person recognizes the efficiency of markets to allocate goods and services, than it is hard to find someone good who denies this. My guess is McCloskey's group of feminist economists may have interesting things to say about gender but likely disagree with laissez faire. And there's plenty of Marxist economists who I'd probably rather have a lunch time conversation with instead of a mainstream neoclassical.

But if we define free market with a bit more (pardon my french) "badassery." I think we get a different answer. If free market means that an economist recognizes not only the efficiency of markets in traditional goods and services but also in non-traditional productions of social institutions and the majority of existing public goods, well then I think there's plenty of people "doing good work" even though I disagree with their conclusions. In my own research I would say the following.

Steven Levitt does a lot of applied work to show counter-intuitive examples of where demand curves slope down. He shows that crime is significantly driven by social factors like abortion which would otherwise be considered totally unrelated to crime. But this doesn't cause him to come out in any way against the state on crime control.

Isaac Ehrlich does great work measuring out the deterrence effect and arguing for the economic way of thinking. He argues that the best way to decrease crime is to increase punishment. He supports the status quo death penalty if not more wide-spread application. In so far as the state is provider of such services (for Ehrlich I think it is) I wouldn't consider him very free market. John Lott is much the same way but more free market in so far as he emphasizes private gun ownership. I still think both bodies of work are very good and still very good economics.

[Arare Litus]

"Philosophers, unlike economists, are not under the illusion that they are scientists and tend not to look down on other non-scientists and on non-academics the way economists do. That kind of attitude is probably healthy in natural science but very destructive in non-science (like economics) in which a hard core of sorts is likely to be determined via an arbitrary process as opposed to by a process that aims at truth "

That attitude is never healthy - for example, physicists once (and many still do) have a disdain for other sciences that is not reflective of reality. Physics succeeds because it looks at very simple systems, someone who looks at a simple system and gets good results should be proud - but it does not follow that someone looking at a much more complex system and getting less precise results is not valuable and important. Indeed, what is more significant? Understanding our society better or getting the 101th digit of the electron mass? There is a huge difference between justified pride, and snobbery. One is constructive, significant, productive - the other has no redeeming qualities that I am aware of.

I will quibble with the claim that Philosophers do not hold this type of snobbery - many do.

Further the statement on economics "hard core of sorts is likely to be determined via an arbitrary process as opposed to by a process that aims at truth" is questionable - how is economics, at its best, not applied philosophy?

"I wasn't open minded because I thought economists should use methodological individualism and purposiveness as the starting points of analysis. In my mind rejecting those postulates would be to reject economics as such. Then he asked me to name a good economist who is neither free market oriented nor uses the economic way of thinking. I couldn't think of one."

I take it that "hard core" means fundamentals? And that Lomasky thinks, legitimately, that a small change in the hard core will have the biggest impact? Of course - but don't we change our "hard core" by applying it in the "protective belt", and then weighting how well it explains reality and were it is lacking, and using reality as a measure and correction of our model (hard core)? Where you miscommunicating due to your assumption of the scientific method, and Lomasky holding some other method? Was Lomasky simply lamenting the fact that most scientists/academics don't actually do science, and instead just publish what they can? Isn't this true of all disciplines? When the system is set up to reward publications, as it is measurable, we can expect this - doing meaningful significant work is hard, cranking out something that nominally compares something to theory and doesn't say much is much easier. Reward people who do this, and you will see more of them. Sure - but this is a criticism of human nature and poor measure of success, not on the science itself (i.e. it is a lament that good science and insight is rare). You should point out that this follows from the economic core: incentives matter.

Thinking about fundamentals is key, but like everything we learn from discussion - with others and reality (via observation, measures, etc.). Once we have a decent hard core we can't have huge fundamental changes, without the hard work of probing reality in detail. Isn't the fact that economics now has a stable hard core suggestive that the "standard model" is decent, and further gains will be hard won?

[Arare Litus]

"Caplan's work would imply that the average economists is significantly more free market than the average person."

I would suggest the current economic meltdown, and the many economists who wanted stimulus and bailouts, indicates that the measurement used in Caplan's work did not capture truly held beliefs - until ones beliefs are confronted with a hard test we can't tell if one really does buy it, the quick anti-market and pessimistic bias introduced in many economists suggests, strongly, that the survey Caplan relied on didn't actually capture peoples strongly held and deeply thought out positions - but instead reflected "easy come, easy go" stances.

It would be interesting to see if someone was wise enough to redo this survey at the height of the hysteria of the mess to see how deeply economists, in general, actually believe in the free market when push comes to shove.

[Arare Litus]

Just reading up on Lakatosian research programmes on Wikipedia:

"The scientists involved in a programme will attempt to shield the theoretical core from falsification attempts behind a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses."

Was Lomasky teasing you? Was he making additional auxilary constraints to protect is "core" thesis on purpose, as a meta-example? [I don't know him, or his style, but I know a couple people that would do things like this for fun and to see who catches on...]. Was he falling into the trap of protecting his claim in the way Lakatosian description indicates will happen (and we all know from our own, and others, tenancy in argument to not give up...).

[liberty]

That does seem extremely narrow. It is partly a personality thing, and partly the way that Harvardesque mainstream economics is done these days, but I find Stiglitz-ites, market socialists and non-free-market agent crowd (and to some extent Post Keynesians) to be far more interesting than the Harvard "mainstream."

But, I also think its worth looking at what the DSGE people are doing, and many of them are Harvard /MIT/etc.

However, For me there is a difference between "good economist" and "good mathematician" or "clever thinker." I think a lot of the bad agent modeling, and the DSGE modeling often come from the "good mathematician," as do some of the mainstream economic papers. A lot of the mainstream economic papers, and many of the heterodox papers (and some of the top name economists, especially Keynes and arguably Marx, Samuelson, and many others) are from the "clever thinker."

One reason I am wary of some of the things said on this blog about getting into top journals and getting a tenured job is that it is very easy to slip from "good economist" to "clever thinker" once trained with clever tools, and when aiming for mainstream recognition. There is at least one economist from the Austrian crowd that I think is dangerously close to falling into this trap. Sadly, very few economists notice that their fellow economists are doing this until far too late, and it happens to all of us to some degree during our careers, I think.

[Zac]

@Arare "I would suggest the current economic meltdown, and the many economists who wanted stimulus and bailouts, indicates that the measurement used in Caplan's work did not capture truly held beliefs"

I don't think this follows. Caplan's work shows the average economist suffers significantly less from anti-market bias. The problem is the average Joe on the street is really just that bad. The average Joe disagrees with how the situation is being handled because they want more market interference (protectionism, immigration control, more spending, etc) not less market interference. So whatever Brad DeLong is asking for, the public is asking for an even stupider version of it.

Whatever problems anyone has with the mainstream economics profession, the economics of Krugman et al is superior to the 'folk economics' of John Doe.

The most puzzling question raised by Caplan's work and public choice economics in general: why aren't policies MUCH worse than they actually are?

[Greg Ransom]

It's weird that economists think that a model is meant to apply to a subset of experimental physical science is just the right one for thinking about there very different science of complex phenomena.

Lakatos was a philosopher of math who sought to make sense of Popper's failed research program.

It seems to me like excuse making to think this is just the right philosophy of science for economics.

Most philosophers of science would rather dump the failed Popper research program than embrace Lakatos.

[LVDH]

There had been Lakatos but we also had Kuhn, the story about revolutionary versus normal science etc. If revolutions do not happen on a day-to-day basis in, say, physics, why should we expect revolutionary, innovative work taking place in economics on a continuing, daily basis? Furthermore, as a Misesian might object, in contrast to what is the case in physics - where new secrets are really out there to be discovered both on a subatomic and a cosmic scale - economics as the theoretical study of human action may in the end indeed be less exciting after all, human action two thousand years ago not being fundamentally distinct from human action today. From this perspective the superiority complex of physicists is understandable even if irritating.
What about Lomasky´s ideological affinity? Positivists and analytical philosophers were traditionally rather left-leaning, see the Vienna Circle, Otto Neurath etc. What is so special about Lomasky that we should consider his comments of great significance?

[Peter Boettke]

Let me be clear --- Loren Lomasky is one of the leading Libertarian political philosophers since Nozick -- see his Persons, Rights and Community.

Also, the Lakatosian stuff wasn't being discussed, and I wasn't making a comment (even in my pointer to articles by Smith and Rizzo) on the philosophy of science. I was simply making a point about basic economics and the outer edge of the discipline. There is an issue of the analytics of supply and demand, and there is an issue of applying supply and demand to new areas. Loren was suggesting that perhaps supply and demand is not all we economists presume it to be and that we should think about that. The group there last night was more interested in pushing supply and demand into areas that are often not thought of. This sort of "economic imperialism" and the way in which one does it, was what Loren was pushing back against.

And he wanted to know who was doing the best work in the profession that challenged that, and was at the top places. Even that is not quite capturing his challenge to us. But ultimately it was check on dogmaticism that he wanted to provide.

Pete

[Chris]

Arare Litus,

Natural scientists' disdain for people working outside the "hard core," which is made up of the current fundamentals of a research program, has its benefits. It simplifies the division of intellectual labor and keeps everyone moving along a research path that has proven fruitful in terms of understanding the world, making predictions, curing diseases, splitting the atom, getting men on the moon, etc. It keeps everyone on the same page. An institution that helps keep out ideas and approaches that could prove unsettling at a science's core is peer review. And as long as natural science keeps producing worthwhile and useful results that have a bearing on reality, the costs of keeping out good but heretical ideas are certainly more than offset by the order that is maintained. At least, that's the way a Lakatosian would view it.

Paul Feyerabend, Lakatos's friend and fellow student of Popper, disagreed, and came to the conclusion that "anything goes" (that is to say, any method and any approach should be permissible in science). An "anything goes" approach across science would certainly produce more novel theories, but could lead to a lot of redundant or wrongheaded work.

You mention that economics looks at something much more complex than does physics. This is true. And this is why a methodology that necessitates adherence to a "hard core" is a mistaken one. Ethics also looks at something more complex than physics, and that is why it is not a science. In these cases an "anything goes" approach (within certain practical limits) is what is needed.

Only research programs that look at relatively simple systems can legitimately evolve into a science. Economics therefore is mistaken in thinking that it is or can be a science. It should not have a hard core, and there should not be a group of academic journals, publishers, and universities that guard its center. Human nature means that there will always be an in-group (or in-groups, in the case of the various fields of philosophy, albeit relatively weak ones). But what I find here is than an out-group (the Austrians) seem to give the in-group so much respect. This, combined with a belief among at least some of the bloggers here that economics is a science, seems almost self-defeating to me, unless Austrians are looking to usurp the center.

I can't see how a good philosopher could possibly view e.g. chemistry with disdain or distaste. What is there not to respect? Sure, some otherworldy ethics professors or metaphysicians may view themselves as doing more fundamental stuff than anyone else and adopt an arrogant attitude as a result, but again that kind of thing isn't a dominant attitude among philosophers. Economists (not necessarily Austrian Economists) are much more prone to snobbery.

If economics is applied philosophy, then it should not have a hard core. According to your reply to Roger Koppl above, the lack of a hard core is what Loren Lomasky was describing about philosophy. I don't understand your questions about the hard core in your later comment. "Hard core" and "protective belt" are just concepts from the philosopher Imre Lakatos that now have a pretty fixed meaning, since hardly anyone works on these issues anymore. Pete Boettke's talk of "edge of the protective belt" makes no sense to me in the present context.

I can combine chatting about Lakatos with the subject of the problem of peer review by pointing you to the recent interview (the podcast) accessible toward the bottom of the linked-to page. The interviewee (Donald Gillies) did his PhD with Lakatos as his supervisor, and is speaking here about the problems of peer review. It's interesting to note that he mentions Wittgenstein as an example of someone who worked outside the peer-review process, which is ironic given what Pete Boettke said about Wittgenstein a week or two back:

http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/gillies/index.htm

The fact that economics now has a stable hard core despite having such a lousy track record compared with that of the natural sciences (which legitimately have a hard core) is what a lot of outsiders find troubling, although they may not think of the problem in terms of a "hard core." A hard core is the result of, not necessary precondition for, the success of a research program.

[Chris]

Pete,

I understood that you brought up Lakatos, and that his name wasn't brought up by Lomasky, and I think that's great, as I believe economics has a problem in terms of methodology, and very much appreciate the chance to discuss this within the broader context of the philosophy of science with some economists I very much admire.

[Arare Litus]

Zac,

"Just 30 percent of Americans say they support Bush's package, according to an Associated Press-Knowledge Networks poll ... Despite the president's pleas that the package is urgently needed to prevent an economic meltdown, 45 percent say they oppose Bush's proposal while 25 percent said they are undecided."

I agree that the general public is less free market than an average economist, if this was not true it would be somewhat disturbing, but I suspect the magnitude is not as high as the survey suggests - as the survey was done in a time of equilibrium and ease, and we have witnessed many economists demonstrate much pessimistic and anti-market sentiment.

A lot of economists are also welfare economists - which of course is in their self interest, as it increases the range of their role - so one must question what it means to "believe" in the free market, if it has to be heavily regulated it isn't very free.

As far as I can tell to be free market is to be libertarian - at least partially. The extent that you believe in the free aspect of the market is the extent your views are consistent with libertarian views. If one rephrased the question to one of libertarian views, giving a quick definition of the view and choice of agreement with a given level of freedom, I suspect the number of economists who are free market would drop.

[LVDH]

Wow, Chris, great post! Now IMHO economics is a science, arguably even a more fundamental science than, say, physics. Modern physical science, with its expensive experiments, particle accelerators, space rockets etc. costs a lot of money, and would probably be unthinkable in any completely non-capitalistic, or pre-capitalistic world... Ergo without the level of prosperity characteristic of capitalist economies, and absent from pre-capitalist systems, no real progress in modern physical science would be possible either. In that sense economics, since it explains the pre-conditions for capitalist prosperity, is arguably a more fundamental science than physics, chemistry etc.

[liberty]

I think Chris has it exactly right. David Andersson makes the observation as well that bloggers here seem to respect AER, JPE, QJE etc above journals in other disciplines that may respect Austrian methodology more--I think this is, in part at least, based on a desire to crack the hard core, or to put the discipline of economics straight. This is good--but it may be futile, this depends on why it is the way it is.

Hayek, and others in the Austrian tradition, have made significant contributions, and learned significantly from, other disciplines. These other disciplines respect Austrian methodology. Why can we not do an end run around the hard core that is so misguided in economics?

The problem may simply be that economic results are so important to politics that there will inevitably be a number of economists who let themselves be essentially bought off by politicians (given fame, jobs, whatever) and they will always form a hard core to protect their methods and results. What then?

I worry that some Austrians have fallen victim to the belief that they must publish certain kinds of work, and as much as possible in those top journals, even if they must shrinky-dink their research program so that they can produce results that the journals will respect.

[Arare Litus]

Greg,

"It's weird that economists think that a model is meant to apply to a subset of experimental physical science is just the right one for thinking about there very different science of complex phenomena."

I disagree that it is weird, in fact I do not see any other plausible model of how to address reality: you build up a core set of beliefs, consisting of some built in priors we are born with + experience and teaching, and we test this core against our observations (both external, as well as internal, contradictions). When the core is in conflict with reality we try to figure out why:

http://arare-litus.blogspot.com/2009/04/algorithm.html

Does anyone actually think an any different way? Can we? I have yet to hear a model that is substantially different than this. If there is one I would be surprised, since it should have a huge impact and we should all know about it.

Kuhn and others underwhelm me, they are true enough, but are these models actually surprising or different than what any reasonably critical thinker automatically & quickly observes from noting how they, others, and groups learn? There is a theory that much of philosophy is hung up on discussing and "showing" things that any reasonably honest thinker realizes routinely, but do not pursue due to the obvious nature of the ideas. Looking at much of philosophy tends to support this theory [this is not to say that all philosophy is empty or routine observations dressed up as significant and original - again, like all sciences/academics it is hard to do real significant work].

[Arare Litus]

Chris,

"[D]isdain for people working outside the "hard core," which is made up of the current fundamentals of a research program, has its benefits. It simplifies the division of intellectual labor and keeps everyone moving along a research path that has proven fruitful in terms of understanding the world, making predictions, curing diseases, splitting the atom, getting men on the moon, etc. It keeps everyone on the same page. "

I submit that legitimate *pride* has all these benefits, as well as everyone having different preferences of what they are interested in. Disdain adds nothing to the mix, other than a "lunch tax" - I only see *negatives*, not positives, coming from disdain.

"[Economics] should not have a hard core"

"opportunity cost", "incentives matter", etc. These are a "hard core", and are good. Let me capitalize that: Good. Why should economics not have a parsimonious hard core that clearly makes up an economic way of thinking, that leads to predictions about situations, and can be tested? Sure, we can agree that they are "not true" at some level, and there may be cases where they break down - but that is interesting, testable, and gives us knowledge about humans.

"methodology that necessitates adherence"

It does not. I suspect that a lot of complaints about methodology are not complaints about actual methodology, but about the weaknesses, bias, etc. of humans and misapplication of methodology (you can say this is the "actual" methodology, and there is some interest in laying out and criticizing this...). Which of course economics tells us a lot about, with a simple parsimonious hard core model of people & society.

" "anything goes" approach "

Anything does go in science. And when people find a novel and useful new trick it is seized on - with the originator often getting a noble prize for their efforts. Hardly punishment. Sure, it is hard to convince people of the utility - but when Newton (& others) came up with calculus simple arbitrage essentially guaranteed that the idea would prevail (again, arbitrage - a simple hard core of economics that simplifies thought).

"Only research programs that look at relatively simple systems can legitimately evolve into a science."

I disagree - perhaps you have a different definition of science than me, or simple system. Perhaps you are saying that we can only productively think near the edge of what we can easily understand and know - this is true, clearly. If ethics etc. lack any sort of "hard core" that simply means that they are arguing about something that we do not have a grasp on - and they are likely getting lost in semantics and do not have enough "knowns" to pin down problems and thought. Sure, I can agree with this too. Perhaps this is simply a statement that it is fun, but unproductive, to work too far from what we currently know. Agreed then. This simply means that people working on the problem should move closer to what we know, and build up from there, instead of getting lost in the ether in the hopes of getting a grand theory to "explain everything".

I don't think simple a good description of where work is productive, close to what ever our core is - and we always have some sort of core - where we should work. This allows us to evolve our core forward towards better understanding. This is the hard trick of research - learning the core, then finding projects that are "at the edge".

I wish I could recall the quote, but there is a famous quote that goes something like this "science progresses at the infinitesimal edge between the trivial and what is impossible to productively grasp and consider". The edge is narrow, which makes it hard to find something on it to work on, and the trivial is only trivial after learning it (a hard enough task). To me this quote sums up how thinkers approach things - they push the boundary of the known out. Most people work too far inside or outside the boundary to be productive - a "good" thinker/scientist/philosopher is one who is closer to the line than others.

[Greg Ransom]

This helps. Pete wrote:

"Loren was suggesting that perhaps supply and demand is not all we economists presume it to be and that we should think about that. The group there last night was more interested in pushing supply and demand into areas that are often not thought of. This sort of "economic imperialism" and the way in which one does it, was what Loren was pushing back against.

And he wanted to know who was doing the best work in the profession that challenged that, and was at the top places. Even that is not quite capturing his challenge to us. But ultimately it was check on dogmaticism that he wanted to provide."

[Arare Litus]

"I don't think "simple"[/"complex"] [is] a good description of [the cutoff] where work is productive, close to what ever our core [edge] is [a better description] - and we always have some sort of core - [of] where we should work. This allows us to evolve our core forward towards better understanding. This is the hard trick of research - learning the core, then finding projects that are "at the edge"."

Sorry, one paragraph there is extremely hard to parse - I hope this makes it better. I should have proofed it more times...

[Arare Litus]

"here seem to respect AER, JPE, QJE etc above journals in other disciplines"

If one wants to influence thought within, and gain funding, in a field you must be convincing to those members. There is nothing strange or wrong about targeting those journals, aiming for top journals in any discipline is a good idea. I don't think Austrians aim only for those journals, and would also consider more generic ones in a beat [Science/Nature/etc.] as well as top ones in outside fields. The goal is impact, aiming for the top is a way to achieve that. Aiming at the top of our field is especially important, especially when trying to get some honey out of a common honey pot...

[LVDH]

I believe that at least some of the traits of mainstream economics are indeed premised on the idea that economics should mimick as much as possible physics. See e.g. the superior valuation of articles as contrasted with writing books. Writing articles was traditinally the way scientists - Einstein is a good example - made a career in physics. Now at least some economists who do not comply with this scheme have impact by writing books. On the other hand many articles - perhaps most - published even in top journals have no impact at all, are not even cited once. Still publishing in such an outlet will further the author´s career. I guess that is the real motivation for economists to try to publish in top journals, furthering their personal careers, rather than impact... There is probably at any moment never more than a relatively small number of economists who can have real impact.

[Arare Litus]

"I guess that is the real motivation for economists to try to publish in top journals, furthering their personal careers, rather than impact... There is probably at any moment never more than a relatively small number of economists who can have real impact."

This is true for all people & disciplines:

http://arare-litus.blogspot.com/2009/04/34-of-economics-work-is-useless-success.html

http://arare-litus.blogspot.com/2009/04/what-is-austrian-economics-what-is-its.html

But don't assume that what we observe is based on negative intent - the system as set up merely rewards certain behaviour, this says nothing if the "gaming" of the system is intentional or not.

[Arare Litus]

"I guess that is the real motivation for economists to try to publish in top journals, furthering their personal careers, rather than impact..."

This is true of all fields, only a subset are interested in / capable of digging deep and most papers are jetsam:

http://arare-litus.blogspot.com/2009/04/34-of-economics-work-is-useless-success.html

http://arare-litus.blogspot.com/2009/04/what-is-austrian-economics-what-is-its.html

But don't assume a negative intent - which leads many to despair with the peer review "game". The system is set up to reward certain behaviours, that does not mean everyone is maliciously gaming the system, simply that certain behaviour is rewarded. To a sizable degree we train people to take tests and not question things, reward them, and then they become profs - it is no surprise that a fraction of profs will be deadly boring, not be curious people, and do work that is not significant. But, as in all parts of life, there are always some interesting people around you can find and work with...

[Daniel J. D'Amico]

Given Pete's clarifications, I think Lomasky has a great point! Again with regard to the crime and punishment literature I recommend reading the recent back and forth on prisons over at Cato Unbound. These blog posts exemplify precisely what is wrong with the debates surrounding prison overpopulation.

Yes economists have unique theoretical tools that could help resolve such an issue, but they are too often too narrowly focused upon traditional notions of supply and demand that they fail to address the complicated and philosophical concerns raised by leading members of the field. Lott and Loury are talking past one another rather than with one another.

Loury says the prison system is over crowded and racist. Lott says criminals are rational. Loury says the application of privatized prisons has exaggerated the problems he already alluded to. Lott says no they haven't deterrence works.

There's nothing explicit within economics that says deterrence based paradigms are the only way to go. Deterrence was a convenient end for Becker to take as given in order to get traction out of formal modeling techniques on the issue of crime. But lots of other ends could also be investigated. Its the manipulation of the means of punishment and the price responsiveness of criminal behaviors that is uniquely economic.

[Arare Litus]

Zac,

I take my comments back:

"Only 53% of American adults believe capitalism is better than socialism." - Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey.

[Greg Ransom]

There's something wrong with your software.

About every 4th or 5th comment doesn't post or immediately deletes.

How long has it been since you've updated your software?

As far as I can tell, you're using buggy software or you have problems with your data base.

[Greg Ransom]

Sorry, what I sometimes don't see is any link the the next page of comments.

[Paul Johnson]

It's hard for me to imagine: "Who besides people at GMU, and who are not market-oriented in the economics profession are doing good work?"

Markets are the core distinguishing feature of any modern economy.

Would he ask: "Who in the physics profession and is not time/space/matter oriented is doing good work?"

[LVDH]

So Lomasky doesn´t like price theory, that´s exactly what one would (and should) expect of a philosopher. Still I believe price theory should be the pride of economists.

[LVDH]

The question makes sense, but perhaps should be phrased differently: if the mainstream in your discipline finds your work misguided, why not turn to philosophy? This is indeed always an option. It´s probably easier for a physicist, an economist etc. to turn to philosophy, than the other way around. Carnap first tried a career in physics if I remember well. (Actually he couldn´t get his Ph.D. accepted in a physics department...) Husserl was a mathematician etc...

[fundamentalist]

I found this discussion very interesting even though I'm not an academic of any kind. Here's something to consider regarding Loren Lomasky's question: could it relate to the issue of objective truth? The reason I ask is that most philosophers (I don't know about Lomasky) don't think objective truth is possible, let alone desirable. As a result, philosophers tend to look for originality, cleverness, or the next new thing. And they don't seem to be too interested in reality because they can't agree on what reality is. That seems to be post-modern philosophy, to me.

Austrian econ comes from a much older tradition that claims to be able to discern truth through reasoning from self-evident truths. BTW, I agree with the Austrian tradition. This obsession with reality and certainty about truth that we Austrians have irritates the hell out of post-modernists. They consider it arrogant. So I wonder, not having been there, if Lomasky was trying to move the students away from that certainty about truth and grounding in reality. Fortunately, it seems he didn't succeed. Just a thought. Could be way off base.

[Zac]

@fundamentalist- Fortunately you're off base. He's a deontological libertarian and an uncommonly good and readable philosopher. I highly recommend _Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community_.

Also he has a sweet beard, fwiw.

[K Sralla]

"You mention that economics looks at something much more complex than does physics. This is true"

Chris's statement was very thought provoking.

I think we must define what thing or phenomenon (noumenon?) (more specifically than something) economics seeks to decipher, and answer the question why mathematics/physics does or does not work on this thing. Are economists sure they know what thing they are seeking to understand? Maybe some thing turns out to be no thing or every thing.

If some thing we seek to know by economics is more complex than the reality described by physics, then economics must go down the path of philosophy or theology, but not modern science as it is presently defined or understood by working natural scientists. The modern natural scientist (steeped in the traditions of neo-positivism) sees the reality sought to be described by physics as all that is or can be (meaningful) in the universe. Indeed, all natural science is a subset of physics! All biological, geological, and chemical processes and any related sub-branch falls under this umbrella. There can be nothing more or less complex than the reality described by physics. The nature of this physical reality is the unity (theory of everything) that the Vienna Circle sought. It was the religion of Richard Mises. If there is more to reality that does not branch back to mathematics/physics, and economics is a path to discovery of a portion of this higher reality, then we must call it something else besides science. Adam Smith saw economics as in fact seeking to describe an aspect of the ontologically necessary being. Modern physicists rue such a thought and naturally have an affinity for Kant. As Sproul says, Kant erected a wall very few dare try to scale. Maybe Austrians are unwitting trying to jump over the wall while the neoclassicalists have a solid hand firmly around your foot.

[LudwigVDH]

I am not sure physical reductionism is still the working philosophy of many or most natural scientists. In any case there is now also an opposite tendency. See e.g. the scientists sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation, devoted to the exploration spiritual questions. Some now apparently see (or claim to see) "traces of God" in the Laws of Nature.
Political philosophy is not my principal field of interest at this time but I have put Loren Lomasky on my reading list.