Can Scientific Ideas Come Prematurely?

See Rafe Champion’s post on Prematurity in Scientific Discoveries by Ernest B Hook (Ed). Scientific explanations can be “premature,” i.e., arrive too early to be accepted or understood. Gunther Stent’s explanation for prematurity is that the “premature hypothesis cannot be connected to canonical knowledge by a simple series of logical steps.” This implies that “data which cannot be transformed into a structure isomorphic with canonical knowledge are a dead end.” The book provides many cases, such as the work done by French scientists on tic behavior (and the Tourette syndrome) in the late 19th century and which took nearly 70 years to come to the attention of the scientific community.

In a private email Rafe seems to be saying that the same could be said of Austrian economics (AE), it has arrived prematurely on the scientific scene. AE’s hypothesis could not be connected to the canonical knowledge of pre-WWII and mid-twentieth century economics and social sciences.

In Mises’s view, there was no “Austrian economics” before WWII. In his mind the opposition was not with neo-classical economics but with historicism. This being said, it is true that what has come to represent the body of AE today was developed roughly since the 1920s (economic calculation, the role of knowledge, entrepreneurship, etc). So at a critical point around 1930, AE branched off from the rest of neo-classical theory. From this perspective, it could perhaps be said that it became premature in its development (compared to the rest of the discipline).

How long can a theory remain premature is a good question. It also relates to entrepreneurial discovery. A new theory is comparable to an entrepreneurial bet. Sometimes it takes a long time for others to realize the value of what has been created (in spite of the energy spent advertising the new creation). For decades, Mises and Hayek’s view of socialism and economic calculation remained unimpressive (unknown?) to most social scientists. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the approach suddenly became relevant (see Heilbroner’s “Reflections After Communism” in the New Yorker in 1990). My bet is that as the interest for innovation processes and new knowledge in markets increases, so will the interest in AE. Prematurity will come to pass…

Comments

[PrestoPundit]

In part "pre-mature" = doesn't generate a self-sustaining bureaucracy in academia or industry.

In many ways the work of Charles Darwin remains "pre-mature" = what is self-sustaining is work in mathematics or in microbiology, etc. Stuff that generates endless research problems. Work on the conceptual framework of Darwianian evolution goes neglected -- and is mostly a sideline hobby worked on in an off-hand way by folks dedicated to work on other things, e.g. S.J. Gould and other paleontologists.

Austrian economics as a global explanatory framework is in the same situation as Darwinian evolutionary biology.

Another example -- global brain theory and the work of Friedrich Hayek. Fuster points out that Hayek's work is still ahead of its time. Edelman also works in this field, but most work simply on specialized problems that have huge bureaucracies behind them.

[Rafe]

AE went into decline while the modern form of positivism (logical empiricism in the US) became dominant in the philosophy of science. Mises could see it coming but still in his 1933 book the main target was historicism. Popper demolished positivism in 1934 and then went after historicism on his account. How come they never compared notes or even acknowledged each others efforts? What a disaster! How come Hayek didn't manage to broker a merger of his best assets at the MPS?

On the topic of Hayek and psychology, Jack Birner has a considered opinion that is worth a look. See the link from this piece

http://catallaxyfiles.com/?p=2461

[Steven]

I take the point, although when AE ideas started out they weren't a 'whole' theory, they were variations on free market theory and a reaction against socialism and through iterations and development by people like Mises and Hayek. So while the AE school may now be an ideological 'whole' it wasn't then so the most appropriate aspects of AE were taken forward while others were (temporarily perhaps) discarded. Like Milton Friedman said, it is the economists job to come up with alternatives to policy, rather than needing to subscribe to a full overriding school of thought.

[Carlos]

I agree. Darwinian evolution was a whole theory, but AE wasn't, so it isn't comparable. While aspects of AE, like socialist calculation, may have taken a while to get attention, they can't be viewed as a whole overriding philosophy. Classifying things as being 'positivist' or whatever else is reductive, each point and proposed policy needs to be judged on its own merits. Perhaps my view has been influenced by methodological individualism!